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 In 2017, a group of users on the website 4chan attempted to establish a new meaning of 
the common “OK” hand gesture. Claiming the sign meant “white power” the intention of this act 
was to trick left leaning internet users and the media that an innocuous sign was racist, hence 
turning everyone unaware against them. A common narrative surrounding the situation was that 
the new meaning for the gesture as established by this group was a “hoax”. This situation serves 
as an interesting case study into understanding how we mean things by the use of signs. I will 
argue that the new meaning as established by the 4chan users is not a hoax. First, I will make a 
connection between signs like the OK gesture and dogwhistles. I will then label signs like the 
gesture “quasi-dogwhistles”. Then, I will argue against the new meaning being a hoax by 
appealing to an intentionalist theory of meaning. Intentionalism states we mean things by 
intending to change other’s psychological states and we change other’s psychological states by 
making them aware of our intention to do so. By appealing to the natural and non-natural 
meaning distinction as found in Grice’s introductory paper of intentionalism, I will demonstrate 
the multiple ways we can deny the fact that the quasi-dogwhistle’s meaning is a hoax. Finally, I 










On the 28th of April in 2017, journalist Emma Roller tweeted out two pictures. The first 
was a photo of two right-wing celebrities, Cassandra Fairbanks and Mike Cervonich, holding up 
the widely known “OK” hand gesture. Roller posted with the first photo: “just two people doing 
a white power hand gesture in the white house” (Matthews 2018). The second image was a 
diagram demonstrating in a crude manner the resemblance the OK gesture had to a “w” and a 
“p” which in turn symbolized the phrase “white power”.1 The second tweet also featured a link 
from the Anti-Defamation League.  
Both the comments and images Roller tweeted referred to an infamous circumstance 
where members of an online forum on the website 4chan created a hoax image with the intent of 
tricking liberal media and left-leaning internet users into believing that the OK hand gesture 
actually meant “white power”.  The major intent of this act was to make the left-leaning groups 
that recognized the white supremacist use of the gesture appear hysterical to those not in the 
know. In other words, it was made so that those who believed the hoax would ostracize 
themselves from other political actors on the stage of American politics.2  
In 2018, the online journal Vox wrote this about the incident: 
“To [the users of 4chan] and alt-right loyalists, this was the ultimate proof that the prank had 
worked: A left-leaning journalist had been fooled into thinking an innocuous hand gesture was a 
secret sign of deep, racist evil. Especially funny to them was when Roller explained her tweet by 
 
1 For an example of this image, see Appendix I. 
2 To see the plan explained by the original post, see Appendix II. 
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referencing a diagram … originating in the 4chan post that launched ‘Operation O-KKK’…” 
(Matthews 2018). 
I think the above quote captures a common way of thinking about the OK gesture and its 
meaning, especially by those who did the act. This interpretation of events takes the new 
meaning perpetuated with this image of the OK sign as a “prank” or a “hoax”. It is important to 
ask here: What are we calling a hoax? I think there are three aspects of this situation that one 
might be tempted to call a hoax. One of these is clearly a hoax and the other two I think are 
presently unclear. The first and obvious hoax is what we can call the strong etymological claim. 
If the diagram spread around by the 4chan users is taken to be an etymological claim about the 
origins of the OK gesture, then we can say this claim is a hoax. It is simply historically false that 
the OK gesture originates in meaning “white power”. I have no problem calling this a hoax.  
The second and less obvious hoax is what we can call the weak etymological claim. The 
weak etymological claim may acknowledge the fact that the OK gesture did not originate with 
the “white power” meaning and that the new meaning came about later. It is worth noting that 
there is some evidence of those associated with far-right circles using the gesture before the post 
on 4chan (Matthews 2018). Of course, association with the far-right does not entail that the use 
of the sign meant “white power”. This second hoax’s falsity is harder to prove, but I am going to 
take it for granted that it is false and the spread of the “white power” use of the gesture came 
from the 4chan post. 
The third and least obvious “hoax” is the claim that the OK gesture means “white power” 
(or something adjacent to that) when used by these 4chan users. The “hoax” here is that these 
4chan users tricked others into thinking that when they used the OK gesture it meant “white 
power” when in actuality it did not. If we accept this as a hoax, then this means we must accept 
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that when these 4chan users used the OK gesture they did not actually mean “white power” in 
any sense. I think this is still undecided and much more interesting of a claim than the second 
hoax. The only fact of the matter that seems to show that the OK gesture used in this context did 
not mean "white power" is that the group that used the sign claims it did not. I do not think this is 
reliable enough evidence. 
The situation becomes more complicated when we acknowledge the fact that the use of 
the OK gesture in right-wing circles has skyrocketed since the spread of this image.3 The fact of 
the matter is, with this attempted hoax came the correlated use of a sign in various groups of the 
far right. A fair question to ask from this acknowledgment is: What does this sign mean now that 
it is being used in these new contexts? Ultimately, what drives this question are larger concerns 
such as whether the use of this sign in certain contexts is racist or harmful. I will not address this 
issue directly due to there being many relevant and adjacent arguments that would need to be 
decided upon before making such a decision. However, I will provide an argument concerning 
such a sign that will make it easier to come to a conclusion about such matters.  
Let us lay out our example more clearly. We can imagine a collective group G that 
recognizes the use of a sign S to show that the user means M1. G1, a subset of G, attempts to 
establish a new meaning of S (let us call this meaning M2) such that group G2 believes S means 
M2 when used by G1. Another group G3 does not recognize such a meaning (in other words, G3 
only recognizes M1). G1 claims that, in fact, they do not actually intend for sign S to mean M2, 
but rather only intend to trick G2 into believing that when G1 uses sign S, they mean M2. 
Furthermore, G1 and related groups (G4,G5,G6…) start using sign S abundantly and claim that the 
 
3 See Appendix III and IV 
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use of such sign maintains the M1 meaning.
4 Now we can ask: does the Sign S mean M2 in any 
way when used by G1 and the related groups? 
 I will argue that in using S, G1 does in fact mean M2 at least in some sense. In other 
words, for the OK gesture in our previous example, I claim the third hoax is not a real hoax. To 
make this case I will analyze the meaning of a simpler sign; a dogwhistle. A dogwhistle is a term 
notoriously used in modern politics to send different messages to different groups. Since the sign 
S as previously described seems to have a similar nature but also clearly deviates from the 
typical dogwhistle, I will label signs like S “quasi-dogwhistles”. Using an intentionalist theory of 
meaning, I will analyze both the typical dogwhistle and the newly identified quasi-dogwhistle. I 
will then emphasize the role of Gricean “natural meaning” in analyzing the quasi-dogwhistle. 
2. Dogwhistles 
2.1 What are Dogwhistles? 
Dogwhistles can be defined as terms that send one message to an outgroup while 
simultaneously sending a second message to an ingroup (Henderson, McCready 2018). It is 
common for the ingroup message to be considered controversial, offensive, or disgraceful to a 
wider audience. Most commonly, dogwhistles are utilized in a political context to convey a 
message to only a portion of the intended audience. This is usually the case because the speaker 
calculates the message is unpalatable enough to conceal from some portion of their audience but 
useful enough to allure another portion of that audience (Henderson, McCready 2018).  
 
4 The related groups of G4,G5,G6… are supposed to represent groups that can be distinct from G1 since they did not 
create the new use of the sign. However, since the creation of G1’s new established meaning, these connected groups 
begin to use S in abundant amounts. A real-life example of these groups would be the use of the OK gesture from 
various right-leaning groups such as Trump supporters or The Proud Boys. 
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A popular example of a dogwhistle is the term “welfare queen” after it was popularized 
by Ronald Reagan throughout his first presidential campaign (Demby 2013). The term, on the 
surface, resembles a characteristically undefined woman who takes advantage of government 
financial aid to live a life of luxury and laziness. The message to the ingroup is clear; it refers 
specifically to black women. Another example of a dogwhistle is the use of “states’ rights" 
(Perlstein 2012). The term was infamously mentioned by Lee Atwater, a Republican strategist 
who spearheaded the Southern Strategy which emphasized appealing to the racist sentiments of 
the south to win votes.5 On the surface, the term seems to simply show support for the federalist 
system the United States was built upon but in actual use, it was associated with black 
oppression and is now associated with anti-abortion movements in the modern day. The phrase 
allows one to speak about overturning central government decisions that prioritize benefits 
toward minority groups without having to blatantly take a stance against said decisions. 
Jennifer Saul has recently analyzed and classified different types of dogwhistles (Saul 
2018). Saul distinguishes between three types of dogwhistles, what she calls “explicit intentional 
dogwhistles”, “implicit intentional dogwhistles”, and “unintentional dogwhistles” (Saul 2018). 
Explicit intentional dogwhistles are the stereotypical example of a dogwhistle. This is used when 
someone wants to spread an explicit message that they do not want others to recognize usually 
due to its taboo or hateful nature. They intend one implicit message to an ingroup and one 
explicit message to an outgroup.  
Implicit intentional dogwhistles are more complicated. They involve an appeal to 
someone’s racist or prejudiced sensibilities while not making them explicitly acknowledge said 
 
5 It may be relevant to mention that Atwater was an adviser to Reagan. 
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sensibilities. In other words, implicit intentional dogwhistles are designed to appeal to people 
who do not want to recognize themselves as explicitly hateful but who still harbor hateful beliefs. 
This aspect makes the implicit dogwhistle harder to reject and call out compared to the 
stereotypical explicit dogwhistle. Unintentional dogwhistles are quite straightforward. It is when 
an unknowing party of the dogwhistler’s audience picks up on the term and uses it without 
intending the double meaning. An example of this would be someone who is particularly 
interested in representing his local government’s autonomy from the federal government and 
says: “I support states’ rights”. This person can be pro-choice and not realize that such a term is 
used by certain speakers to show an alignment with anti-abortion values.  
 On a surface level analysis, we can separate the average dogwhistle into two meanings. 
To bring up a previous example, we can separate “welfare queen” into one meaning of “any 
woman who is lazy and takes advantage of undeserved, poorly planned government aid” and 
“black women”.6  
2.2 Why are Dogwhistles Relevant? 
Let us abstract what happens with the average dogwhistle which I am treating like an 
explicit intentional dogwhistle. Speaker X uses an utterance U to speak to an audience A. A can 
be split up into two distinct groups, A1 and A2. Due to specific circumstances, X believes that the 
only way to stay in A’s good graces is to send separate messages to both A1 and A2. As such, 
 
6 See Khoo (2017) for an inferentionalist account of dogwhistles. In this account, dogwhistles do not contain 
separate implicit messages but rather are used to trigger inferences only particular audience members will make. I 
think Khoo’s account is plausible, however, it is important to note that Khoo is simply arguing that there are not two 
semantic meanings encoded in the use of dogwhistles. An intentionalist account of meaning is not necessarily 
concerned with embedded semantic content but rather the belief that is trying to be communicated. The intentionalist 
can agree that “You look great” may clearly semantically deviate from “You look terrible”. Yet, the intentionalist 
will still maintain that “You look great” can mean the same thing as “You look terrible” under the right context and 
intentions. All of this is to say, even if I expect you to infer something from specific words I use, it could still be said 
that what I mean is the message after the inference is completed. 
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when X uses U, X intends for one meaning to be understood by A1 and another to be understood 
by A2. A1 understands U to have the meaning M1  and A2 understands U to have the meaning M2. 
However, it is possible that A2 is aware of meaning M1, but also understands that X “really” 
means M2 when saying U. 
There are many obvious similarities to the abstracted dogwhistle case and my previous 
analysis of signs like S. For one, both scenarios involve a speaker using something like a sign or 
utterance to display different messages. For another, these different messages are tied to different 
groups that have varying awareness of the other kind of meaning that is attached to the sign or 
utterance. There also seems to be a relation of what a sign or utterance “really means” as it 
relates to the different meanings that are attached to them. And finally, both involve focusing on 
what the speaker intends for their audience to believe and understand by the speaker’s use of the 
sign or utterance.  
While these entities seem to share similar a function, I think it is clear they are not 
identical. For one, the OK sign is a gesture and many signs that have a similar use are usually 
non-linguistic.7 Secondly, signs like the OK gesture are by design supposed to have their 
controversial use discovered. This clearly deviates from the regular dogwhistle's obvious design 
to have its controversial use undiscovered and unknown as long as possible. As such, due to the 
similarity and differences between the two, I will call S and entities like it a “quasi-dogwhistle”. 
Furthermore, by showing you the connection between both dogwhistles, quasi-dogwhistles, and 
speaker intention, I hope to demonstrate why an intentionalist theory of meaning will be 
 
7 You might argue against this characterization of the OK gesture due to its origin of being based on the linguistic 
message "okay". While I obviously cannot deny this clear connection, I want to emphasize the image-like role the 
gesture takes in online spaces similar to the use of images like Pepe the Frog.  
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beneficial in analyzing these signs. Before moving on to the intentionalist account, I will lay out 
in more clear terms what a quasi-dogwhistle is. 
3. Quasi-Dogwhistles 
Quasi-dogwhistles are coded signs that operate in a similar fashion to ordinary 
dogwhistles by the fact that they carry different “messages” to both ingroups and outgroups. 
They also differ from the typical dogwhistle in important ways. I will now lay out the ways in 
which quasi-dogwhistles can be differentiated from the ordinary dogwhistle. 
Firstly, quasi-dogwhistles will typically have three groups as an intended audience: an 
ingroup (G1), an outgroup (G3), and a targeted outgroup (G2).
8 The ingroup and outgroup 
function similarly to how they function in regular dogwhistles. The targeted outgroup is intended 
to pick up on what we can call a “dummy meaning” (M2). The “dummy meaning” is a meaning 
only intended for the targeted outgroup to pick up on, and according to those that use the sign, is 
not the actual meaning of the sign. To reiterate our previous example, the dummy meaning of the 
OK hand sign would be something akin to “white power” which in turn serves to show support 
of white supremacist views.  
While the ingroup may share a similar status to the ingroup identified in the use of 
regular dogwhistles, there are differences between the two. For one, the ingroup of the 
dogwhistle inherently denies that the actual meaning of the gesture or sign is anything offensive. 
For two, the intended ingroup are those that participate in the creation of the sign or at the very 
least, those who participate in the perpetuation of the dummy meaning. This is different from 
 
8 It should be noted Henderson and McCready (2019) have made a similar distinction in their analysis of regular 
dogwhistles. They call the third group "the savvy outgroup". The difference between their “savvy outgroup” and my 
“targeted outgroup” is that the former is not intended to pick up on a coded message while the latter is. For the savvy 
outgroup, there will always be someone who can crack the code, so to speak. 
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when a politician utilizes a dog whistle because the ingroup mostly includes those that are not 
peers of the speaker but rather are removed audience members. Thirdly, those in the ingroup are 
not only aware that the phrase intentionally means "nothing", but they are also aware of the 
targeted outgroup and the dummy meaning. This means, to participate in the ingroup is to 
recognize that there is a dummy meaning and that this meaning is explicitly not the "true" 
meaning of the sign or gesture. 
It may be worth mentioning the metaphor that a title such as “dogwhistle” brings forward 
is slightly misleading when applied to the typical case. For example, when Ronald Reagan said: 
“welfare queens”, by my analysis two messages were being intentionally communicated. The 
first message being: “lazy women who take unfair advantage of poorly placed government aid” 
and the second message being: “black women”. Of course, when a physical dogwhistle is used, 
the only thing doing the hearing is the dog. For other people (and perhaps, other creatures), there 
is no input at all, there is only silence. Compare this to an example of a quasi-dogwhistle such as 
the OK sign.  
In a way, the OK sign is so innocuous and so devoid of any explicit meaning that one can 
interpret its use as akin to silence. By this I mean, if one were to utilize the sign to send coded 
messages to others, there is a sense in which there are not two meanings being sent out but only 
one. The OK sign and other quasi-dogwhistles can be recognized by their effectiveness. The 
most effective versions may be the ones that hide in plain sight and give no intentional meaning 
to other parties. This makes the claim of meaning by the targeted group seem even more 
ridiculous and allows the sign to be continuously used without consequence. With now a better 
idea of the two types of signs we are going to analyze, it will serve us to understand how an 




4.1 What is Intentionalism? 
Intentionalism is the view that humans successfully communicate by revealing intentions 
to change each other’s minds (Harris 2020). In other words, for a speaker to communicate to a 
listener: 1. They must intend to have a psychological effect on the listener; 2. This effect must 
come about by demonstrating the intention to bring it about. Successful communication occurs if 
the addressee recognizes what effect the speaker intended to have on them (Harris 2020).  
To provide a brief example, for me to successfully communicate to you that I like your 
dress, I may say: “I like your dress”. To understand my comment, you are going to infer things 
about my mind and intentions. As such, when I communicate to you the fact that I like your 
dress, I am expecting you to come to believe the proposition: “Clyde likes my dress”, and I hope 
for you to believe that by recognizing my intention to make you believe it. If you think I am a 
snooty jerk, you may infer from your understanding of my mind and intentions that I am trying 
to insult you by stating: “I like your dress”. In this case, since you misread my intentions then we 
call can this a miscommunication. Inherently, intentionalism is about a speaker trying to make 
clear what their intentions are and a listener trying their best to understand those intentions.  
Intentionalism’s creation is credited to Paul Grice, whose paper “Meaning” serves as a 
solid basis for the theory. Grice’s discussion of “meaning” starts off with differentiating between 
two major ways we use the word “meaning”. He calls the distinction between these uses “natural 
meaning” and “non-natural meaning” (Grice 1957).9 I will discuss these more in-depth in the 
 
9 From now on, when using terms like “intentionalism” and “intentionalist”, I am referencing the entire scope of the 
Gricean theory. That includes the natural and non-natural distinction. While many intentionalists may not reference 




next section. For the time being, we can consider natural meaning as something that “indicates” 
and non-natural meaning as something that “represents”. To use one of Grice’s examples, we 
may say that seeing spots on someone’s face may mean they have measles. Yet, it is not the case 
those spots somehow say something like “This person has measles”. Grice labels the kind of 
meaning encapsulated by the measles example “natural” meaning and in contrast, labels meaning 
encapsulated by language as “non-natural” meaning.10 
Intentionalist theories of meaning will be primarily concerned with non-natural meanings 
and how they relate to linguistic utterances, but they need not be. Intentionalists like Daniel 
Harris emphasize the fact that intentionalism focuses on communicative acts and not necessarily 
linguistic ones (Harris 2016). Utterances can be of many mediums, and we can emphasize this by 
the fact that with a clear example. If I want someone to leave my room and I point at the door, I 
am non-naturally meaning something by that gesture. There is nothing inherent about pointing at 
a door that makes it “mean” that I want you to leave. It takes the audience of the utterance to see 
I have an intention for them to believe something, something to the effect of “I want you to 
leave”. The audience must then recognize that I want them to believe that I want them to leave, 
and I want them to gain that belief by recognizing my intention of having them believe it.  
Intentionalism does not focus on how words and sentences mean something in a 
contained system necessarily, but rather emphasizes the importance of the psychological states of 
both the speaker and listener. It comes with the ingrained belief that we share psychological 
states and that these states are transferable (Grice 1976, SWW pg. 286-7 ). Explicitly, 
intentionalism focuses on the concept of mind reading (Harris 2016). Mind reading is 
 
10 See section 4.2 for further elaboration on this distinction. 
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acknowledging that other beings have intentions, thoughts, and desires. It is the process of 
inferring from both knowledge of your own intentions and others’ behavior to interpret the 
purpose of action in other beings. 
4.2 Further Clarification of Natural vs Non-Natural Meanings 
Grice makes the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning to show that simply 
causing a psychological state, disposition, or attitude will not be enough to account for linguistic 
meaning (which seemingly will always be non-natural). I will try to provide a clear example of 
this.  
Imagine a parent with two children. One child is rebellious while the other is not. The 
rebellious child has been skipping school unbeknownst to said parent but the rule following 
sibling is quite aware of their sibling’s actions. As such, we can imagine two different scenarios 
of how the parent is informed of this fact by someone else. In the first scenario, the rule-
following child tells you while alone together: “Your son has been skipping school”. In the 
second scenario, the rule-following child shows you the social media page of the rebellious child 
which contains pictures of the rebellious child skipping school and having fun elsewhere. Both 
scenarios contain something we can call “meaning”, but there is a clear deviation. In the second 
scenario, the parent may interpret the profile and the content of the pictures as meaning their 
other child has been skipping school. Yet, this sort of meaning can be differentiated from that 
one brought about by stating: "Your son has been skipping school". If the picture scenario 
occurred, you could not attribute to the actions of the rule-following child of literally meaning 
“Your son has been skipping school”. This is despite the fact the child clearly intends to change 
your psychological state by showing you the pictures. 
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A natural meaning will signal a fact and bring about a certain belief to the person 
interpreting it. We can imagine a scenario where a father and his toddler are looking outside their 
front window. When the father and the child see a mail truck stop by their mailbox, the father 
may exclaim to his child: “You know what that means! The mail is here!”. The father here is not 
trying to implicate that the mailman by passing in front of their house meant to communicate a 
message of “I have delivered your mail”. What is implied from the father’s statement is that the 
events just witnessed seem to show a certain fact about the world.  
In this case, it is easy to take from the fact that a mail truck stopped in front of your 
mailbox that your mail was delivered. Of course, if the father goes to check and see if the mail is 
there and it is not, then he will have to conclude the event of the mail truck stopping in front of 
his mailbox did not mean the mail was delivered. Similarly, even if the mailman intended for the 
father to see him and believe his mail was dropped off, his action still did not mean the mail was 
delivered. In fact, his actions meant he was attempting to deceive the father in some way. We can 
distinguish this from a linguistic example. 
Imagine for some strange reason the father is now on very good terms with the mailman 
and the mailman calls him every day to say: “I just delivered your mail”. If after one of these 
calls the father checked the mailbox to find nothing, then the mailman’s utterance still meant “I 
just delivered your mail”. It does not matter what actually happened, the mailman’s utterance 
still meant that he had delivered the mail. This shows another inherent difference between 
natural and non-natural meaning. This is why I previously stated natural meaning “indicates” and 
non-natural meaning “represents”. A representation can maintain itself despite if what it 
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represents is true or false. An indication requires that what is being said to be indicated must be 
true for indication to actually occur.11 
 We can consider the distinction I just brought attention to as one of Grice’s main test to 
understand if a meaning is either natural or non-natural. Another test is to simply see if when 
asked: “What did they mean by that?” if you can then in return an answer with a linguistic phrase 
in quotes (Grice 1957, SWW, p. 214). For example, if I asked you what the smoke in the sky 
meant, and you knew the smoke in the sky was from a natural forest fire then you could not 
respond with “It means the same as ‘forest fire’”. Conversely, if you asked me what the smoke in 
the sky meant, and I knew it was someone sending out smoke signals I could quite correctly 
respond “It meant the same as saying ‘Emergency!’”. Even if it was a false alarm, that smoke 
signal could still mean the same as saying “Emergency!”. Yet, if there was no actual forest fire, 
then the smoke in the sky could not really mean there is a forest fire. 
 The “indicate” versus “represent” distinction between the two types of meaning may not 
have been entirely clear when first proposed. I hope the above examples may have made that 
clearer. When one thinks of natural meanings one tends to think of scenarios or situations that 
point to some belief. This pointing is why I highlight the indicative nature of natural meaning. 
When one thinks of non-natural meanings one tends to think of linguistic systems and sentences. 
Those who focus on intentionalists theories of meanings as it relates to language will most likely 
focus on aspects of non-natural meanings because there is nothing inherent to the composition of 
sentences that indicates anything about the world.  
 
11 The reader may be able to imagine scenarios where we do not use “indicate” so strictly. A doctor could say: “This 
spot indicated cancer but after closer inspection it seems it was just a malfunction of the machine”. Here, we may be 
able to take the doctor as saying something closer to “This spot seemed to have indicated cancer, now I know it did 
not actually indicate such a thing”. Even if you disagree, it seems sensible to distinguish between “seems to 
indicate” and “actually indicates”. 
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Under an intentionalist framework, what is embodied behind linguistic utterances that 
gives them their explicit meaning is the intention of the speaker to bring about a psychological 
attitude toward a proposition and have the listener recognize that intention. Intentionally drawing 
your attention to indicate something is different from intentionally drawing your attention in 
order to mean something. As Grice puts it, we want to distinguish the difference between 
“getting someone to think” and “telling them something” (Grice 1957). The reason we do not 
recognize the mailman’s action (in the scenario where he does not speak to the father) as being 
non-natural in meaning is that we do not need to contemplate about his intention nor his intention 
of having us recognize his intention of delivering the mail to understand what his action means. 
 There is another thing important to recognize in the natural or indicative and the non-
natural or representative framing. One can both misindicate and misrepresent. To misindicate is 
to point to the wrong conclusion, but that does not change the natural meaning of the action.12 
The mischievous mailman who stops in front of your house to trick you into thinking he 
delivered mail actions can be taken to have misindicated that your mail was delivered. Yet, once 
that is found out it does not mean his actions indicated your mail was delivered. On the other 
hand, when the mischievous mailman calls you to say: “I delivered your mail” and it turns out to 
be untrue, this is misrepresentation. Misrepresentation allows for the meaning to stay the same 
despite the actual circumstances. If after the call, you go check the mailbox and there is no mail, 
 
12 To clarify this point, I will use an example. For smoke in the sky to naturally mean that there is a forest fire, an 
actual forest fire must be taking place. We can say then that the smoke indicated a forest fire. However, if it turns 
out this smoke was created by a large campfire, then we cannot ultimately say the smoke meant there is a forest fire 
after we find out about that fact. Despite this, to take that there is smoke in the sky to naturally mean that there is a 
forest fire is quite possible and even reasonable. As such, we can differentiate between what we take to be natural 
meaning and what is a natural meaning. What we take to be a natural meaning will influence other beliefs and it will 
be encountering other facts and details that will change what we take a situation to naturally mean. 
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the mailman still meant: “I delivered your mail” even if the fact the proposition encapsulates is 
false.  
 Of course, many utterances will contain both natural and non-natural meanings. This can 
be easily demonstrated. If I said: “white power”, there most certainly will be a non-natural 
meaning being conveyed by my utterance. One example of non-natural meaning attached to 
saying: “white power” may be “I think white people are the superior race of the world”. In this 
instance, when a person utters “white power” they intend to make the audience believe a certain 
proposition and recognize their intention for us to believe said proposition. Yet, hearing someone 
espouse sentiments of white superiority can naturally point to many things. It may naturally 
mean they are a Nazi. It may naturally mean they grew up in the rural south. It may naturally 
mean they organize and participate in certain social groups. Natural meaning is abundant 
everywhere, and where it relates to uses of signs with non-natural meanings is with what 
linguists call "register". 
4.3 Register and Natural Meaning 
  A speaker's register can be akin to the social group they participate in and how this is 
revealed through language. I will make this clear by giving concrete examples. When we think of 
how people speak, we tend to put labels on them. Labels such as "upper-class", "informal", 
"religious", "feminine" and so on. These are all registers (Agha 2003). What registers and the 
recognition of them provides is pragmatic information about the speaker. They give us an image 
of the speaker, an idea of the relationship we have with the speaker, and an idea of the conduct of 
the social practices they partake in (Agha 2003).  
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In other words, when we recognize registers, we notice behavior that naturally points to 
social roles, practices, and ways of being. We can even describe someone’s register range, which 
demonstrates someone’s ability to recognize AND participate in various other registers. We can 
note that just because someone has a register in their register range, it does not mean they 
participate in that register. Typically, an upper-class spoken person will recognize those that fit 
into a “lower class” register, but that does not mean they participate in using that register. This is 
very relevant to the question at hand when we talk about ingroups and outgroups. 
 I believe register is related to natural meaning. I will demonstrate this. If one uses words 
like "tubular" and "gnarly" we may take the use of these words to naturally mean the person is a 
skater. Why? This is because the use of these words seems to indicate that the person that uses 
them not only skates but participates in a skateboarder culture. In other words, it points to the 
fact that they participate in a skateboarder register. What this allows us to do is have an account 
for what many social linguists call "social meaning".  
Social meaning is the kind of meaning that comes across by participating in language 
communities and using registers. Using certain words and certain phrases not only plays into 
what you are trying to get across explicitly but also carries meaning in which we may not 
explicitly intend at all. Using terms that relate us to geographical locations, social status, age, or 
social groups is not something we intentionally get across in many of our speech acts. Yet, many 
linguists are tempted to say that there is still meaning being communicated here. We can credit 
this to Grice’s natural meaning.  
Speaking in certain accents, using certain words, or speaking of specific things can 
indicate or naturally mean aspects about your person. If I am able to reference many famous 
works of art and artists, then you may take that ability as naturally meaning I participate in a 
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register of “art lovers”, “high society”, or “artists”. As such, we should not consider that our 
utterances only have the non-natural meanings I have previously spoken about. In fact, almost 
every use of a non-natural meaning will most likely be accompanied by some sort of social 
meaning or some sort of natural indication of my participation in social groups. 
4.4 Motivating an Intentionalist Framework 
Before I give my own analysis, I should state that there are many other potentially fruitful 
theories of meaning besides intentionalism. In fact, work on the meaning of ordinary dogwhistles 
reflects this.13 In spite of these other approaches, I think there is good reason to utilize an 
intentionalist theory for our present circumstances. Let me start off with a common scenario 
where referring to someone’s intention in understanding what they meant is important.  
Let us say you are talking to a friend about philosophy. They seem very disinterested. 
When you question them about their attitude toward the philosopher named Hegel, they respond: 
“I could care less about Hegel”. As the wise pedant that you are, you know that your friend 
misspoke! It is not “I could care less”. It is “I couldn’t care less”! Yet how do you know they 
misspoke? It is because you are analyzing their intentions. You are reading their mind. If a third 
friend was present and was confused by the sentence, you would simply say: “No, no. What they 
meant was that they couldn’t care less”. You know this from the attitude your friend was having 
toward the Hegel conversation. You know this from the context of the utterance and your 
interpretation of your friend’s intentions. This is why an intentional framework is promising.14 
 
13 To see a good overview of the many positions writers have taken on analyzing dogwhistles, see Henderson and 
McCready (2018).  
14 The well-informed reader may feel as though I am not giving enough credit to other theories of meaning here. 
There are many other explanations why “I could care less” is still understood as meaning “I couldn’t care less”. You 
might think “I could care less” is so common that it conventionally acquired its meaning from incorrect use. This 
may be correct, but I think we account for times when incorrect phrasing is used with no traditional use behind it, 
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It may also be important to establish why using an intentionalist framework will be 
promising in analyzing dogwhistles. For one, dogwhistles uniquely stand out from other phrases 
or uses of language from simple the fact we can recognize that two simultaneous messages are 
being delivered to two different groups. Secondly, we will want a theory of meaning that can 
account for multiple meanings being present in the use of utterance. Of course, an intentionalist 
theory of meaning will not be the only framework that can provide such an answer but there is 
still another benefit for using it. As Saul’s analysis demonstrates, we can account for different 
types of dogwhistles both by the awareness of the audience but also by the intention of the 
speakers. This is why we can differentiate between intentional dogwhistles and unintentional 
dogwhistles.  
The fact remains that even in the use of unintentional dogwhistles, we rely on the 
unaware adoptive use of an intentional dogwhistle. Again, inherently when we want to define 
why and how these phrases or signs mean different things, we rely on the intention of the speaker 
in addressing two different audiences with two different messages. Especially with political 
dogwhistles, we rely on an understanding that many politicians know that they are not allowed to 
say certain things without scrutiny from the public but also know that a major part of their 
demographic wants to hear those things said. As such, they must intend when using a dogwhistle 
to both mean something to one group and mean something else to the other. 
There is another question to ask here: What does it mean for S to mean M2? Let us refer 
back to the specific example of the OK sign having an etymological claim that it actually 
originates in signaling a “w” and a “p” to spread the message of “white power”. What does it 
 
and we still manage to understand what the speaker said. The point of this example is to demonstrate that just 




mean for a sign to represent “white power” and what would someone mean by using them? For 
example, does it mean “I support white power”, “White supremacy is true”, or “I hate 
minorities”, etc. ? I think it is reasonable it can mean all three of these things and much more.  
It may be that to use a sign that says “white power” is to point to an indeterminate 
number of meanings, intended beliefs, and so on. One way this can be accounted for by making a 
distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. I will give an account of such in a later 
section. Another way we can account for this is with an intentionalist framework. Such a 
frameworks allows for the possibility that multiple people can say the phrase “white power” 
without inherently meaning the same thing. This comes from focusing on their intentions for us 
to believe a proposition and to intend for that only to come about by recognizing said intention. 
 Another reason to find an intentionalist framework promising is the relationship it has 
with pragmatics. Many common and traditional conceptions of pragmatic reasoning rely on 
recognizing a speaker’s intention (Harris 2016). If I hear someone say “white power” in which 
the speaker is a counter protestor at a Black Lives Matter protest, I may have a better 
understanding of what is being implicated. At the same time, if I hear “white power” being used 
during a meeting of “white activists” who claim to be fighting “white suppression” how I am to 
understand the intentions of the utterer and its meaning may be different.  
What is implicated by the context, and the speaker's intention all go into pragmatic 
reasoning. This is not to say that the two hypothetical groups above do not overlap. In fact, I 
think they very much can but that goes to my point. The fact of the matter is that groups can have 
overlapping interests and ideals, use the same sign, but non-naturally mean differentiated 
messages. But these different non-natural meanings and actions will have a relatedness that will 
come about by paying attention to natural meaning. If we think there is any relation between 
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pragmatic reasoning and the understanding of dogwhistles and quasi-dogwhistles, having an 
intentionalist framework of meaning will ultimately be beneficial to such understanding a 
connection. Intentionalism is a useful framework because of its comprehensive nature.  
As other intentionalists have shown, an intentionalist theory allows us to settle on issues 
of pragmatics, metasemantics, speech act theory, evolutionary psychology, and philosophy of 
mind (Keiser 2020). Not only that, using intentionalism as a framework is not rejecting the 
intuitively obvious notion that language is somewhat conventional by nature. Rather, it is the 
recognition that the basic acts of communication such as asserting or questioning are not 
essentially conventional (Harris and McKinney Forthcoming). 
 Jessica Keiser has offered a version of intentionalism that focuses on locutionary acts 
and emphasizes that intentional meanings can be consolidated into conventions within a 
linguistic community (Keiser 2020). In this view, conventional non-natural meaning will be 
defined by its absorption of regularity in intentional actions. As such, once the convention is up 
and running it can replace the need for mind reading. The intention will be baked into the use of 
the sign itself without a reliance that for every use of an utterance a reading into the intentions of 
the utterer is required to understand what it means. What I hope I have demonstrated is that 
intentionalism is flexible and is quite prominent in many fields trying to analyze linguistic 
meaning. 
5. Intentionalist Analysis of Dogwhistles 
 Dogwhistles under Gricean analysis will not yield to being defined completely naturally. 
This is because as a previous section demonstrated, by analyzing what each phrase “means” we 
can answer the question in ways that point to the phrases being non-natural. For instance, if 
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someone were to ask: “What did he mean by ‘welfare queens’?”, we can simply respond “He 
meant black women”. When we talk about meaning, we need to keep in mind that most of 
Grice’s account is not focused on how words mean something but rather on how people mean 
something by an utterance. Or in other words, how words mean something is secondary to the 
fact that people non-naturally mean something by certain actions, including a linguistic 
utterance. 
 How can someone utilizing a dogwhistle mean different things to different audiences 
under an intentionalist framework? I think this is very straightforward. Obviously, we can quite 
clearly imagine someone having two different intentions with an action. Let us say I took my dog 
on a walk after I had a fight with my roommate. Of course, it may be apparent that my intention 
was to get away from my roommate and get some space. Yet, it is also possible that after our 
fight, I realized I was neglecting my dog and that he needed to go out for quite some time. Just 
because I intend to take my dog out to get away from my roommate does not mean I cannot also 
intend to take my dog out because I want to relieve his discomfort. The same can be in the 
utterance containing a dogwhistle. 
 In a traditional case of meaning, when we ask: “What did they mean by this utterance?”, 
we will respond with typically one answer. If someone was describing their belief that snow is 
white, what they meant is something similar to saying “Snow is white”. Under intentionalism, 
this will not be the same for dogwhistles. What someone will mean by “Welfare queens are 
stealing government money” will be two different statements: 1. Some group of women who do 
not work are stealing government money; 2. Black women are stealing government money. This 
is because there are two intentions when giving this utterance. One is to have an intention 
directed at and be recognized by the outgroup and the second is to have a markedly different 
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intention directed at and be recognized by the ingroup. Dogwhistles are successful because each 
group recognizes their own directed intention and as such when one uses a dogwhistle in their 
utterances they productively communicate two different assertions. 
 Of course, this is not the end of the picture. There is an aspect of dogwhistles I have so 
far not addressed. It is usually recognized that the more well known a dogwhistle's ingroup 
meaning becomes, the less it will be used. Seemingly, this is because there is an aspect of the 
ingroup meaning that seems more central to the use. In some sense, the ingroup meaning seems 
to taint the other. Once the ingroup meaning becomes salient, it is likely that the outgroup 
meaning seems to diminish in importance. How can an intentionalist framework account for such 
a phenomenon? 
 For one, accounts like Jessica Keiser’s make this easily addressable. In her account, 
lexical linguistic meaning can be established once the act of intending meaning is repeated 
enough to make such a thing salient (Keiser 2020). As such, we no longer rely on mind-reading 
to understand the utterance. We rather use this established meaning to bootstrap our way to the 
intended meaning of the utterer. In other words, our interpretation of the utterer’s minds, 
thoughts, and intentions is bypassed for the salience that such an established word, sign, or 
utterance brings to mind.  
We could account for the fact that this process can be sped up based on the trust of 
another person who claims to have already analyzed the meaning. If someone told a Reagan 
supporter that when Reagan said, "welfare queen" he meant "black woman", then it is up to the 
person being told that fact if they are going to allow this interpretation of Reagan's intention to 
be more salient than their own. If we are convinced that we were misreading someone’s 
intentions, then we are likely to give authority over to someone who seems more knowledgeable. 
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This comes from trust on whether or not the person who tells the Reagan supporter of this hidden 
meaning is a reliable person to understand these intentions. It does not seem out of the question 
that we could take someone else’s reading of utterance to bootstrap our ways to intended 
meaning without relying on our own analysis of such facts. 
 While I think this serves as a good explanation for some of the issues at hand, it misses a 
crucial part of the investigation. It appears under this analysis we place one intention over the 
other. By this I mean, we place the intentional meaning meant for the ingroup as more important 
in deciding the meaning of the phrase than the intentional meaning meant for the outgroup. Why 
is this? For one, we may just regard this feature as a relic of human psychology. Humans just 
tend to think that which lies under the surface is more important or essential than that which lies 
above the surface. To borrow a term from Wittgenstein, this is just a “form of life” we participate 
in.  
I think this can be satisfying to a certain extent, but it obviously does not serve as an 
argument of any kind. It is more of just a claim about the way we think. Another approach might 
say even if we know that there are two outputs being sent out by a speaker that does not mean we 
can receive both outputs at one time. As such, we settle on the one that best matches our 
understandings of the speaker and of their intentions. If we have been convinced by our friend 
that when a person speaks, they actually tend to utilize phrases that have two intentional 
meanings, then we may categorize that person as someone not to trust. As such, when we hear 
their utterances again it may be salient to not only use the new intentional meaning you have 
been provided, but also cut off access to the intentional meaning you intuitively read because you 
no longer trust the person. You can no longer accept it as an intentional meaning. 
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 This last perspective is more detailed and more promising. But again, something is 
missing. We do not necessarily need someone to communicate to us to understand what they 
meant. Or under an intentionalist theory, we do not need someone’s intention to bring about a 
belief and intention to have that recognized be directed toward us to interpret intentions and non-
natural meaning. If I overhear someone tell their spouse: “You look good”, I do not struggle to 
understand what the comment meant because it was not directed toward me. To use Henderson 
and Macready’s concept of the savvy outgroup, part of understanding a dogwhistle by those of 
the outgroup is recognizing the intention directed to others and not yourself. As such, those of 
the savvy outgroup do not have the intention of the coded message directed toward them but they 
recognize it anyway.  
Here, we see that the meaning or salience of meaning toward an utterance does not 
necessarily need to come from the fact it is being directed toward you. Rather, if we combine the 
points from our second suggestion, we recognize coded messages as more salient because they 
line up with other intentions we associate with those that use coded language. We may tend to 
label those that use coded language as sneaky, untrustworthy, and even manipulative. As such, 
the meaning or intention that will become most prevalent to us after we have this impression is 
the one that is hidden away as it lines up more with how we view their intentions overall. We 
disregard that which is directed toward us because we no longer recognize it as homologous with 
the other intentions we read into the utterer. 
With all this said, there is an important thing to remember about my intentionalist 
analysis of a dogwhistle. I have argued that a dogwhistle means both messages it sends out. 
Since the speaker intends two different meanings to be understood, then we can correctly say that 
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two meanings are meant. We can see how such an analysis can easily apply to the case of a 
quasi-dogwhistle. 
6. Intentionalist Analysis of Quasi-Dogwhistles 
There are two main ways we can analyze the quasi-dogwhistle in an intentionalist 
analysis. Both ways will show why the use of sign S can be taken to mean M2 in some way. I am 
going to label these the “generous analysis” and “ungenerous analysis”.15 The ungenerous 
analysis will explicitly analyze the intention of the speaker to deceive and make some portion of 
the audience acquire a specific mental state based upon the audience’s recognition of the 
intention. In other words, we will analyze the quasi-dogwhistle in much of the same way we 
analyzed the ordinary dogwhistle. The generous analysis is to grant the creators and users of a 
quasi-dogwhistle the ability to claim that their sign does not actually “mean” the racist or hateful 
message I have labeled as the dummy meaning. In other words, we will grant them that the 
dummy meaning is nothing more than a prank and does not represent in any way what the "truly" 
intended meaning of the sign is. I will then show by appealing to Gricean natural meaning we 
can uphold that S means M2 in both cases, but not in the exact same way. 
6.1 The Ungenerous Analysis 
The ungenerous analysis is to not take the users of a quasi-dogwhistle at their word. If we 
recall back to earlier, the reason we started on this analysis is because the third “hoax” that S 
does not mean M2 felt unjustified. It felt unjustified because all we had to go work with was the 
 
15 By using the word “generous”, I am trying to make a distinction between the common concept found in 
philosophical writing known as “charitability”. I genuinely do not think we are obliged to grant G1 any claim they 
have made about the meaning of S after we have discovered that they have tricked multiple groups of people. The 
use of generous here is to highlight that we are granting them their claim despite being not required to do so. 
Charitability as it is found in standard philosophical literature seems to be different than this. It is an obligation as 
fair and honest arguers that we should all strive for. 
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claim of the quasi-dogwhistle creators themselves. These claims seem untrustworthy at best and 
so we decided to analyze the sign despite them. As such, I think we can reject their claim to 
innocuousness quite easily. Intentionalism in meaning is marked by the fact that to mean 
something non-naturally we must intend to bring about a certain belief in someone and have 
them recognize such an intention to make that belief come about.  
From this, we can analyze the OK sign quite easily. I believe I have sufficiently laid the 
groundwork to make this analysis straightforward. If we recognize the targeted outgroup’s 
existence and the users of a quasi-dogwhistle’s recognition of that group, then we can cite the 
users of the OK hand sign as intending their gesture to mean “white power” and that they intend 
for the targeted outgroup to recognize said intention.16 Inherently this implies that at least for one 
portion of the audience that consumes it, the meaning of the sign was indeed “white power”. If 
G1 intended for G2 to acquire a specific belief from using S and have the belief come about from 
having the intention recognized, then G1 meant M2 by S.
17 It is as simple as that. All this 
references back to the previous analysis of the dogwhistle. I think in this case, the signs are quite 
similar. The only thing we would need to consider is if when G4, G5, G6, etc. uses the sign does it 
in some way mean M2. I think that will become clearer in the next section. For now, I leave you 
to consider how the association with a group that is outed as being coy and manipulative may 
affect how others read your intentions. 
 
 
16 Again, we may take this as an assertion such as "I am a white supremacist". Therefore, that would be the 
proposition that the speaker was intending the listener to believe by virtue of recognizing their intention. 
17 Remember, in an intentionalist analysis having the intention to bring about a psychological effect and having that 
psychological effect come about from having the intention recognized is what "meaning" is. In the case of the OK 
hand gesture, clearly the belief meant to be brought about can be taken as "I support white supremacy" or related, 
indeterminate meanings as I have previously stated. 
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6.2 The Generous Analysis 
We can grant that the OK hand sign and any other quasi-dogwhistle is a sign meant to 
trick the targeted outgroup into believing what is intended by the speaker as a hoax meaning. In 
other words, we can temporarily grant them the third hoax. We can also grant that in actuality, 
the sign or gesture retains its generic meaning and use it has in everyday life. Under an 
intentionalist framework, we may say that when a person uses this sign in a non-natural way then 
what is important is that for most groups that will see it (including G1,G3, G4, G5, G6…), what is 
the intended meaning of the sign is something more akin to the traditional use of the sign. For the 
OK gesture, this would be a message of “okay” or perhaps even just a signal of contentment.  
What this analysis grants is that the even though clearly G1 intends for G2 to believe a 
certain proposition and wants them to believe this proposition by recognizing their intentions, the 
relationship between this intention and G2 is an exception to the rule. This intention can be 
considered a trick of some sort and any other use of the sign maintains the traditional intention of 
using the sign. As such, even if someone in G3 discovers the truth about G1’s intention toward 
G2, they can recognize that intention as a hoax and not worry about G1 explicitly meaning M2 
when using S. Remember, M2 can be described as something like a sentence or proposition. As 
such, for the OK gesture, it may be something like “white power” or more specifically “I am a 
white supremacist”. What we are granting right now is the fact that M2 does not non-naturally 
mean “I am a white supremacist” or any other non-natural meaning that may be associated with 
the sign. 
 We can recognize that the kind of people that would create a quasi-dogwhistle in order to 
trick a group of people into differentiating and ostracizing themselves from other groups are 
questionable at best. Even if G3 agrees that G1 was only deceiving G2 and does not actually mean 
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M2 by S, they may find that the behavior points to poor qualities. Or in the words of an 
intentionalist framework, we may say that G3 can recognize that G1’s actions may naturally 
mean that G1 has certain negative qualities. Using S in the way G1 does and recognizing their 
deceptive use may naturally point to a specific register. Let us focus back on the OK gesture to 
make this clearer.  
For one, using the OK gesture may point to many different registers. Using the OK 
gesture in context with other colloquialisms that sprout from 4chan may naturally point to a 
4chanian register for those that kind of language is in their register range. As such, a certain 
listener may conclude about a use of the OK gesture based upon their opinion of the register the 
speaker pragmatically exemplifies. If one finds the 4chan community questionable in both their 
actions and intentions in other situations, then they may be justified in associating those that 
participate in that register with certain beliefs. As such, we could recognize that G1 does not non-
naturally mean M2 by S. But, based upon the register that G1 naturally points to in context of 
their use of S, it may naturally mean something like M2.  
Let us look at a non-loaded example. Let us say for this scenario, G1 is a group of kids 
that trick another group of kids G2 into thinking the OK gesture meant “I love ice cream”. G3 is 
the group of teachers that at first do not recognize this new meaning, thinking the OK gesture 
maintains its traditional meaning. One day, a teacher from G3 catches onto the fact that G1 was 
convincing G2 into thinking that the OK gesture meant “I love ice cream”.  
This teacher recognizes that at all other times when G1 uses the sign, they do not actually 
mean “I love ice cream”. But as the teacher notices this, he also notices that G1 has tricked other 
groups of kids to believe other signs mean “I love ice cream”. He also recognizes that G1 talks a 
lot about ice cream amongst themselves saying it tastes great and is a wonderful treat. He also 
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sees that G1 talks about other non-frozen desserts and how much they enjoy them. They also 
make up their own specific names for these non-frozen desserts. He also tends to see that G1 eats 
ice cream together all the time.  
After a while, the teacher may very well take that using the OK gesture in conjunction 
with eating ice cream and using the other dessert slang means that whoever is using the gesture 
loves ice cream. It seems hard to deny that those that participate in these social actions do not in 
some sense love ice cream. As such, the teacher may maintain that the OK gesture does not 
literally mean M2 or “I love ice cream”. Yet, the teacher can ascribe in some sense that the use of 
the gesture naturally points to the ice cream gang register which itself naturally means the user of 
the sign loves ice cream. 
At what point do we differentiate a sign’s meaning based upon if it explicitly non-
naturally means a proposition or if it naturally points to a proposition? What I mean by this is 
that a statement like: “In some context, the use of the OK gesture means the user loves ice 
cream” could be taken as a natural meaning claim that just happens to look very similar to a non-
natural meaning claim. If we extend our scenario, we can account for something further. Let us 
say more groups of kids coalesce around their love of ice cream. Remember, G1 is a group that 
seemingly loves ice cream but also seems to love other desserts. G4 loves ice creams but hates 
pie. G5 loves ice cream but hates cake. These other groups continue like this, all unifying under 
the love of ice cream and differentiating from other aspects of dessert. As such, following G1’s 
lead, the other ice cream loving groups begin to use the OK gesture in their everyday 
communication.  
Again, it may be recognizable that the use of the OK gesture by these groups explicitly 
does not mean “I love ice cream”. But it may also be recognized that there is a correlation 
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between those who love ice cream and those who use the OK gesture in an abundant amount. In 
this sense, this connection may lead people to believe that using the OK gesture a lot in 
conversation, especially in dessert related conversation, naturally means the user of the gesture 
loves ice cream. In this way, S when used by G1 (and G4, G5, G6… for that matter) does mean M2 
in some manner. If one makes the connection between M2 and the state of affairs M2 intends to 
represent, then natural meaning can point to such factors. Just as the smoke means a fire is 
nearby, so does the OK sign (surrounded in this context) signal an ice cream lover is nearby (or 
if you prefer, an M2er). 
All of this is not to say that G1 does in fact love ice cream. Remember, this is just one 
teacher’s perspective on the matter. One may read G1 as just concerned with frozen desserts and 
willing to ask the important questions about them. One may read G1 as being completely ironic 
with their love of ice cream all the way to the bottom of their actions. One may read G1’s 
constant consumption of ice cream as not signaling their love for it but doing something else. 
This may all be up for dispute. But this does not stop people who agree that G1 seems to very 
obviously demonstrate a love for ice cream to interpret a natural meaning from the use of the 
sign. What is then to dispute is not whether the sign explicitly and non-naturally means “I love 
ice cream” but rather if the group that is being associated with an ice cream loving natural 
meaning does love ice cream.  
Focusing on natural meaning for such gestures allows the conversation to not fixate 
inherently on the specific intentions of one individual speaker but rather focus on the facts of the 
matter. We can ask questions like: Is this speaker participating in a culture that would seem to 
support this kind of reading? Obviously, the average person is not going to have a clarification 
on the difference between natural and non-natural meaning. As such, they may just intuitively 
35 
 
recognize that some kind of meaning is coming across to them when these signs are used and put 
them under all one umbrella.  
Those that like to mask their intentions benefit from the conversation being stuck on an 
argument of non-natural meaning so that their actual habits, actions, and attitudes in their 
community go unobserved. If the teacher approached the ice cream gang and said: “If you do not 
use the OK gesture to mean ‘I love ice cream’, then explain why you are always seen carrying 
ice cream cartons” and the kids responded with: “The sign is a joke. We never use it to mean we 
love ice cream, and you cannot prove it” the issue at hand is actually being sidestepped. The 
actual question being asked is: “If you are denying that you have ever stated you love ice cream, 
then why are you always seen around ice cream?”. This question regards the group’s communal 
actions, and to address it they would have to address facts that seem to imply the meaning they 
are denying. They would have to address the natural meaning of their behavior. 
While I separated this perspective from the non-generous meaning of quasi-dogwhistles, 
that was not to say that these aspects of natural meaning do not come hand in hand with non-
natural meaning. In fact, the whole point of our concept of registers is to demonstrate the fact 
that many secondary social meanings are communicated in everyday life. Natural meaning helps 
us understand someone’s intentions. Our understanding of the natural meanings of someone’s 
actions and the non-natural meaning they intend to communicate come together into a cohesive 
whole. 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that intentionalism is a promising theory in analyzing what I called a quasi-
dogwhistle. By appealing to Grice’s natural and non-natural meaning distinction, I have shown 
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that a quasi-dogwhistle will mean something like M2 both naturally and non-naturally. As such, I 
have shown that we can deny that the meaning ascribed to the OK gesture by the 4chan users 
was a hoax. As such, I have also shown that even if non-natural meaning is disregarded, by 
appealing to natural meaning and register we can establish a social meaning that demonstrates 
alignment with certain groups when using certain signs.  
At first glance, my analysis of the quasi-dogwhistle may seem unique. How often is it the 
case that natural meaning and non-natural meaning line up? I would say this is very common. If 
someone with a southern accent said: “I’m from the South”, then we may take the natural 
meaning of their sentence and the non-natural meaning as pointing to the same proposition. This 
proposition is the fact that the person speaking is southern. If a non-natural meaning can be 
construed as relating to social identities, practices, and communities, then it may very well be 
possible that it aligns with certain natural meanings that coincide with it. My main point here is 
to show that the quasi-dogwhistle is not exactly unique as I think my analysis can be applied to a 
myriad of different phrases. 
 It is also important to remember one thing: what we interpret to be a signs’ natural 
meaning is not guaranteed to be correct. Like I have previously said, it can in a sense 
“misindicate”. Again, one of Grice’s concrete examples of natural meaning was: “Those spots 
mean measles” which a parent says after looking at a sick child (Grice 1957). We can recognize 
that seeing spots on the face does not guarantee measles. There is a perfectly good chance that 
the spots do not actually mean measles. We may imagine that the child does not actually have 
measles but rather has chickenpox. In this case, the spots on the child's face did not mean he had 
measles. They meant he had chickenpox. Yet, even if it was untrue that the spots meant measles, 
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it was not unwise of the parent to assume that it was a possibility. Hence, a good parent worried 
about the spots will take their child to the doctor to be verified if their suspicion is correct.  
The parents can only find out the truth with proper investigation and careful 
consideration. To deny those that are worried that the spots mean measles is to deny a valid 
worry. If a mother insisted to take a child to the doctor due to her belief that the child had 
measles and the father refused on grounds that it was uncertain if the child actually had measles, 
then we can take the father’s position as unhelpful at best or malicious at worse. The mother 
wants to take the child to the doctor to see if the child has measles. If the father wants the 
investigation to be avoided, then he needs to provide significant evidence of why the mother 
should not take the spots to mean measles. 
 My point here is that when uncovering the meaning of a sign or utterance, most may find 
the fact of the matter that the sign or utterance meant something is secondary. Primarily what is 
to be the main concern is what such a meaning may represent or indicate. If I believe that either 
you intend or happen to indicate a belief that I find potentially harmful, then what I am worried 
about is not the meaning of the sign but rather the potential of harm. If I think an utterance 
implies that you intend to hurt me, you are not going to reassure me that you do not intend to 
hurt me by getting into a debate about meaning. Rather, what would be more effective is to show 
why such a representation was false, or why what I thought was being indicated is not the case. 
 If you keep insisting on focusing on the fact that you did not mean that you were going 
to harm me and ignore my requests to demonstrate such a fact, then I may take you as unreliable. 
What I am asking for you is to give an account that shows you are not a person that would intend 
to hurt me. I will become less and less concerned about what your words meant, especially if the 
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only accounts I am given are my own interpretation of your intentions and your claims against 
them. 
 One may sum up that the point of communication is to express ideas. What we can 
consider most important in many instances is not being stuck on how we mean certain things but 
rather how those potential meanings can be instantiated in real life. The meanings that can cause 
worry will not just be the ones that clearly are contained in the words or intentions of the utterer. 
The meanings that concern us can be social, ones that indicate actions and activities that we 
disagree with. Our utterances are not said in a vacuum and neither do our interpretations of those 
utterances have an empty void as a backdrop. What we say and what we mean is always 
contextualized and we as listeners know that at least implicitly. 
 When people argue that the OK hand gesture has come to mean something like “white 
power”, getting stuck on the fact that those that used it just meant it as a “hoax” or “prank” 
seems to be sidestepping the issue. The kinds of questions that need to be addressed are: Why 
does the use of this sign seem plausibly associated with white supremacist beliefs and values? 
There may be a completely innocent and valid explanation of why such a thing is true. But for 
however long those that use the sign and are associated with it avoid having this conversation, 
the more likely it seems they are using a discussion of meaning to avoid a discussion of the 
beliefs and practices they participate in. 
I will state that while the non-natural analysis of the quasi-dogwhistle seems correct to 
me, I can also see where it may remain unconvincing. For one, just because we can definitively 
state someone meant something by the use of some sign at one time, does not guarantee that they 
mean the same thing when using that sign now. In other words, the 4chan users could simply 
state that they did intend to mean “white power” for the targeted outgroup, but no longer intend 
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to mean that at all when using it now. I hope the generous analysis and appeal to natural meaning 
shows why this is still incorrect. 
More and more, we run into problems of meaning that seem complicated and hard to 
construe an answer for. Recently, Chet Hanks, the son of the actor Tom Hanks, released a line of 
merchandise titled “White Boy Summer” (Elan 2021). With the combination of this title and the 
use of a font that many labeled “racist”, the merch has been publicly seen as problematic. This 
has led to a backlash of some sort embodied by this quote from a tweet commenting on the 
incident: “Man how tf y’all gonna look at a font and call it racist…”.18 By my account, the 
answer to this question is simple. We look at a font and call it racist by looking at the natural 
meaning embodied by certain uses of the font in social circumstances which we deem racist. 
Natural and social meanings are relevant entities that we talk about quite often even if we do not 
realize it. It is worth noting that the font used by Hanks was associated with both Adolf Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf and online white nationalists (Elan 2021). Clearly, a social and natural meaning has 
been established for this font in some way. 
Lastly, I want to mention an interaction I found between two users on Twitter reacting to 
a post about Hanks and the font. The first comment said: “This font seems racist to me [for] 
some reason” and in response, the second commenter said: “Why did I know exactly what you 
meant when you said that font feels racist?!”.19 To use what I have argued for here, I think 
clearly what these two are recognizing is a natural meaning from the use of the font. They 
recognize the register the font participates in. Just like these Twitter users, we are all very 
capable of seeing smoke. As such, we assume that if we see smoke, it means a fire is nearby. If 
 
18 See Appendix V for the full tweet. 
19 See Appendix VI for the full exchange. 
40 
 
you want to deny such a claim, you are wasting time discussing how smoke cannot “mean” 






















(Anti-Defamation League 2017) 
The diagram image fabricated by the 4chan board. It should be noted that the “HOAX” was 










(Anti-Defamation League 2017) 













Above is a picture of Milo Yiannopoulos. Yiannopoulos was a popular right-wing and alt-right 
figure during Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. Some speculation of why 4chan 
decided on using the OK gesture in their hoax was due to Yiannopoulos' use of it in pictures 








(Hoke 2020)  
A picture of the far-right, white nationalist political group The Proud Boys using the OK gesture 











At the risk of these tweets appearing fabricated, I have decided to block out as much information 
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